1. Three Opinions of the Ancients

98. On the first point [n.97], as Innocent III reports (On the Sacred Mystery of the Altar IV ch.9), there were three opinions: one, that the bread remains and yet the body of Christ is truly with it; second, that the bread does not remain and yet is not converted but ceases to be through annihilation or reduction to matter or corruption into something else; third, that the bread is transubstantiated into the body and wine into the blood.

99. Each of these opinions were meant to save the common conviction that the substance of Christ’s body is really there, because to deny this is plainly against the faith, as is clear in d.10 q.1 n.15. For from the beginning of the institution of the Eucharist it was expressly part of the truth of faith that the body of Christ is truly contained there.

a. Reasons for the First Opinion

100. Argument for the first opinion is as follows:

[First reason] - As is the case in natural things, one should not posit more than natural reason proves necessarily, for more is superfluous (as is plain from Physics 1.4.188a17-18 and other places in the Philosopher [as Physics 6.189a15-16, 8.6.259a8-9]). So in matters of faith one should not posit more than can be proved from the truth of the matters of faith. But the truth of the Eucharist can be saved without transubstantiation;     therefore etc     .

101. The proof of the minor is that what is required for the truth of the Eucharist is a sign and a thing really contained signified by it; the substance of bread with its accidents can as well be the sign as the accidents alone can, indeed more so because the substance of bread under the species is nutriment more than the accidents are; therefore it is more representative of the body of Christ as to the idea of spiritual nutriment. Now the thing contained, namely the body of Christ, can be as well saved with the substance of the bread as with the accidents, because it is not more repugnant for a substance to be together with a substance than to be with a quantity of that substance.

102. And a confirmation of the above reason [n.100] is that one should, as far as possible, always posit fewer miracles; but by positing that the bread remains with its accidents, and that the body of Christ is really there, posits fewer miracles than positing that the bread is not there; for in the former case no accident would be posited without a substance.

103. [Second reason] - The second reason is as follows, and it more or less returns to the same: in matters of belief handed on to us according to universal understanding, it seems that a way of understanding should not be determined which is more difficult to understand and on which many unacceptable results seem to follow. But that the body of Christ is in the Eucharist is a truth thus universally handed on to us, and the understanding that no substance of bread is there seems more difficult to sustain there, and on it follow more unacceptable things than if one posits that the substance of bread is there;     therefore etc     .

104. The proof of the major is that, from the fact that the faith is given us for salvation, it should be determined and held by the Church in such way as is more suitable for salvation. But by positing such an immoderately difficult understanding, and one on which unacceptable things seem manifestly to follow, occasion is given for turning away from the faith all the philosophers, or rather almost all, who as it were follow natural reason; or at any rate occasion is given for impeding them from converting to the faith, if they are told that such things belong to the faith. Indeed, it seems that a philosopher, or anyone else who follows natural reason, would have a greater difficulty about what is posited here in the denial of the substance of bread than he would have about all the articles we hold about the Incarnation. And it seems a cause for wonder why in the case of one article, which is not a main article of the faith, such an understanding should be so asserted that thereby it lies open to the contempt of all who follow reason.

105. [Third reason] - The third reason is as follows: nothing is to be held as belonging to the substance of the faith save what can be had expressly from the Scriptures, or is expressly declared or expressed by the Church, or evidently follows from what is plainly contained in Scripture or plainly determined by the Church. This major seems sufficient, because for nothing else would anyone have cause to expose himself to death; and he would laudably expose himself to death for everything that is of the substance of the faith; and also it seems a levity to believe firmly what in none of these ways would be held as certain, because there is no sufficient authority or reason if none of these ways is found. Now it does not seem to be expressly obtained in these ways that the substance of bread is not there. For in John 6, where the truth of the Eucharist is much proved, the thing is plain when Christ says, vv.51-52, “I am the living bread; whoever eats of this bread     etc .” and in I Corinthians 10.16 Paul says, “The bread which we break, is it not a communion in the body of Christ?” Nor is there found anywhere that the Church has solemnly declared this truth, nor even how it could be evidently inferred from anything manifestly believed. Therefore      etc.

106. If you say, as one doctor says [Aquinas], that in Matthew 26.26 when Christ says “This is my body” he is insinuating that the bread does not remain, because otherwise that proposition would be false - this argument is not cogent:

Because, given that the bread did remain, the substance of bread would not be pointed to [sc. by ‘this is my body’] but what is contained under the bread would be; just as now the accidents are not pointed to, because then the proposition would be false. But the sense is: ‘this being, contained under this perceptible sign, is my body’.

107. Again, in sacraments of truth there should be no falsity; but the accidents naturally signify the substances which they affect, and if they (that is their substances) were not underneath them, the natural signification of the accidents would be false; so this is unacceptable.

If you say they signify the body and blood of Christ and that this signification is true - on the contrary:

Natural signification does not change because of a signification instituted at pleasure; therefore the accidents signify the same as what they were signifying before; so there would, on this score, be falsity in the natural signification if the things signified were not under the signs. But when one posits that these signified things are underneath the signs, truth in the natural signification of the accidents is secured.

Truth could also be had in signification at pleasure, because the things signified at pleasure by institution could be contained within those substances.

And thus in every way would truth be obtained in the case of each signification; but according to that other way [sc. signification at pleasure] there is falsity in the natural signification; therefore the other way is more appropriate than this one.

b. Reasons for the Second Opinion

108. For the second opinion [n.98] one can argue by reasons similar to some of the preceding ones, because the first three [nn.100-105] seem sufficiently able to be adduced in its favor. First because more miracles are posited if one posits transubstantiation than if one denies it [n.102]; next because transubstantiation is as difficult to understand, and seems as repugnant to natural reason, because it seems to everyone who follows natural reason to be irrationally posited, and consequently it would more turn them from the faith than would saying that the bread, through annihilation or some other way [nn.103-104], absolutely did not remain; next, third, because transubstantiation is not more proved, or rather is less proved, by Scripture than the bread’s not remaining is.

c. Thomas Aquinas’ Reasons against the First and Second Opinion

109. Against these opinions a certain person [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.11 a.1 q.1] argues:

Against the first opinion [n.98] as follows: that it is unacceptable, impossible, and heretical.

110. The first claim [sc. unacceptability] is proved in three ways:

First because it takes away the reverence due to Christ as he is contained in the host. For the cult of worship [‘latria’] is due to him as he is in the Eucharist but, if the substance of bread remained there, such cult should not be shown, because it would be idolatry by being worship of a creature.

111. Second, the opinion is said to be unacceptable because it takes away the signification of this sacrament; for the sacrament should signify first the body of Christ as being the first signified thing; but if the substance of the bread remained, this substance would have the idea of first signified thing.

112. Third because it takes away the due use of the sacrament, for if the substance of the bread truly remained it would truly be bodily food; but the use of this sacrament is that it is spiritual food for the soul, not the body.

113. Now on the second point, namely that this position is impossible, Aquinas argues through the same middle term, both against the first opinion and against the second [n.98]. For nothing can begin to be where it was not before save through change of itself or change of something else into it. But the body of Christ does not change by the fact the Eucharist is carried out, for it remains in heaven as before. Therefore, if nothing is converted into it, it is not more really in the Eucharist than it was before - and this is impossible.

114. The third point, that it is heretical, is proved as follows: because it is against the word of Christ when he instituted the sacrament, Matthew 26.26, “This is my body.”

He does not say “Here is...” but “This is...” But if the substance of the bread remained, or was annihilated and not converted, it would be truer to say “Here is my body” than “This is my body.”

115. Against the second opinion [n.98] he argues specifically against its positing the reduction there of the bread into underlying matter. For either it would be made into bare matter (and this is impossible because then there would be matter without form, and thus there will and will not be an act of the matter). Or it would be made into matter under some other form, but this is unacceptable because then either that other new body (of which it is the matter) would exist together with the species and with the body of Christ, or it would be moved from its place; and both are unacceptable. The first because it is impossible for two bodies to exist together, and the second because the local motion of this new body could be perceived by perceiving the expelling of the other body that surrounds it.

d. Rejection of Aquinas’ Reasons

116. However it may be with the opinions, these reasons do not seem to be effective in rejecting them.

117. The first [n.110] is not valid, because he who now adores Christ in the Eucharist is not now an idolater, and yet it cannot be denied that there is some creature there, namely the species; but what should be adored is not the perceptible container but the contained Christ. And then one might say in the same way that Christ is contained under the quantum and quality of the bread, and so the bread is not adored but Christ who is contained in the bread as in a sign.

118. And if you object “at any rate the simple, who do not draw this distinction, would be idolaters,” I say that so can it be argued against you now, because the simple do not distinguish the accidents per se from the contained body of Christ. But in all such matters there is one response, that the simple give adoration within the faith of the Church, and this suffices for their salvation. But the more advanced adore distinctly what is contained and not the containing sign, and that whether the containing sign is an accident only or the substance of the bread with the accident.

119. As to the second argument [n.111] I say it proves the opposite, because if the substance of bread were there, the double signification [n107] would be true: namely the natural one whereby the accidents signify their substance, and also the one that is by divine institution, whereby a perceptible thing signifies the body of Christ - it would be true. But now the only signification that can be preserved as true is precisely the second one.

120. Nor can it be said that the natural signification would, because of the other signification that is by institution, come to an end; because then the accidents would no longer lead naturally (as concerns themselves) to an apprehending of the substance of the bread; instead their natural signification or representation, which yet was in them before, would totally cease. And then, after this cessation, the accidents would affect the intellect to make it apprehend the body of Christ in some way otherwise than before (supposing the substance of the bread is not there); this is a nothing.a

a.a [Text canceled by Scotus] and then the accidents would in some way affect the intellect differently before the consecration than afterwards; which is a nothing.

121. I reply therefore that the first thing by institution signified should be the body of Christ, and so it is, whether the substance of the bread remain or not. But the first thing signified by the accidents, namely what they signify naturally, is always the substance that they qualified before or were of a nature to qualify before, because the natural signification does not change.

122. As to the third argument [n.112] I say that it is not valid, because it is manifest even now that the species give nutriment, according to the Apostle I Corinthians 11.21, “One indeed is hungry, while another is drunk,” and this from receiving the sacramental species; and yet there is no denial here that it is food for the soul when that is given which is contained under the bodily food. Thus too, if the bread were posited as remaining there, it would be bodily food and yet what was contained under it would be food only for the soul.

123. As to Aquinas’ other point, about impossibility [n.113], a sufficient solution was given in d.10 q.1 nn.149-58, that the body of Christ does not begin to be here without any change, if one extends ‘change’ to include that body’s altogether simple presence.

124. To the point about ‘here’ and ‘this’ [n.114], it is nothing against the minor premise. For it is true that ‘here is my body’ and it is true that ‘this is my body’; however it is not true that ‘this accident is my body’ but that what is contained under the accident is so. In the same way, if the substance of the bread remained, that which is the substance of the bread would not be Christ’s body, but that is which is contained under the bread. But the Savior preferred to use the word ‘this’ rather than ‘here’ because it expresses the truth more, although both statements might be true.

125. To the argument against the second opinion [n.115] one could reply either by positing annihilation of the bread totally, or if reduction to the matter from which the bread comes to be is posited - the argument is not cogent. For it could be said that the reduction would be to bare matter and into matter under another form, and it could be said that the reduction is into matter remaining where it was before or moved from there in its location.

126. And when it is argued [n.115] against the first reply [sc. reduction to bare matter] that then the matter would be without form and so would be in act and not in act, there is equivocation over the term ‘act’. For in one way ‘act’ is that difference of being which is opposed to potency, insofar as all being, and anything that is, is divided, namely into act and potency. In another way ‘act’ states the relation that ‘form’ states to what can be formed, or to the whole of that of which it is the form.

127. And there is an equivocation over ‘potency’ in the same way. Because as potency is opposed to act in the first way [n.126], it states diminished being, namely something to which the ‘to be’ that is distinct from being in act is not repugnant, even when it is outside its cause; but being that is in act as act is opposite to potency is being that, whatever it may be, is complete in its ‘to be’ outside the soul and outside its cause. In another way potency states a principle receptive of act (in the second way of speaking of act [n.126]), the way matter is called potency and form is called act.

128. This distinction is made clearly plain by the Philosopher Metaphysics 9.1.1045b34-35, 6.1048a25-27.

129. The members of the distinction can also be proved from what the Philosopher says in many places when he speaks of act and potency now in this way and now in that, as in Metaphysics 7.16.1040b10-16. And in Metaphysics 8.6.1045b20-21 he says that from act and potency something per se one comes to be, where the understanding is not about act and potency as these are opposed, because as opposed they do not exist together. In another way, in Metaphysics 9.6.1048b1-6, he says, “Now there is an existing in act of a thing, but not as we say it exists in potency;” and then in explanation he manifests the fact in the case of many opposites, as being awake to sleeping, seeing to having one’s eye closed, work completed to work not completed. And to the one part of this difference, he says, determinate act belongs, and to the other part the possible.

130. As concerns the issue at hand, matter without form is in act and not in potency in the first way [n.129]. The proof is from Augustine Confessions 12.7.7; here are his words: “Matter itself has received this imperfect ‘to be’, which namely it has in potency;” and he has to posit this, because he concedes that matter is created by God.

131. But before it was created, it was in potency in the first way [n.127]. The proof is because otherwise that would be created which is incapable of being created. Therefore, after creation it is not in potency in that way, for then there would, after creation, be no entity of produced matter. Only after creation, then was it not in potency in that way but in the second way, because it was receptive of act in the second way of speaking of act. But now there is a mistaking of the question, or ‘ignoratio elenchi’, when it is said [by Aquinas, n.126] that ‘matter is in act in the first way and not in act in the second way, therefore it is in act and not in act’. In the same way there is equivocation about potency on this side and that.

132. Also, if the second sense were granted [nn.115, 126], namely that the matter would receive some form and would remain together with the body of Christ, one could not refute the claim that this would be possible for God, because it does not include a contradiction. For if the body of Christ, even as a quantum, can be together with a quantity of bread, and quantum is more repugnant to quantum (as far as concerns their being together) than the substance is to the substance and consequently more than substance is to any substance whatever (for thus does the Philosopher argue in Physics 4.8.216b10-11, that if two bodies can be together then any number of bodies at all can be together), then it follows that it is not impossible for any substance composed of the matter and a new form to remain together with the body of Christ. If, again, it be granted that this body would be expelled, and yet not in such a way that the expelling of the air would manifestly appear - neither can this be proved impossible for God, because it includes no contradiction.

e. Scotus’ own Response

133. As concerns this article, then, namely what is to be held [n.97], I reply that it is commonly held that neither does the bread remain (against the first opinion [n.98]), nor is it annihilated or reduced to first matter [sc. against the second opinion, n.98], but it is converted into the body of Christ.

134. And Ambrose seems expressly to say much to this effect, two authorities from whom were adduced above [n.94], and several are contained in Gratian Decretum and Master Lombard [nn.94-96].

135. But what principally seems to be the moving factor is that one should hold about the sacraments what the Holy Roman Church holds, as is contained in Gregory IX Decretals V tit.7 ch.9 [cf. Ord. IV d.5 n.12]. And now the Church holds that the bread is transubstantiated into the body and the wine into the blood, as is manifestly contained in Decretals I tit.1 ch.1 sect.3, where it is said, “Jesus Christ himself is priest and sacrifice, whose body and blood in the sacrament of the altar are truly contained under the species of bread and wine;” and immediately there follows, “the bread having been transubstantiated into the body and the wine into the blood by divine power.”

136. There is also an agreement with this because the Church prays, “Let the mixing and consecration of the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ be eternal life for us who receive it” [canon of the Roman Missal].

137. And another agreement is that someone not fasting cannot fittingly celebrate, but after he has received the Eucharist a priest can still celebrate again, as is contained in Decretals III tit. 41 ch.3, “With the exception of the day of the Lord’s Nativity, and unless cause of necessity supervene, it suffices for a priest to celebrate mass once a day.” Hereby it is intimated that on the day of the Lord’s Nativity and when necessity impels, it is permitted to celebrate two masses in a day.

f. To the Reasons for the First and Second Opinion

138. To the arguments adduced for the first and second opinion.

As to the first [n.100], I concede that in matters of belief too more things should not, without necessity, be posited, nor more miracles than is necessary. But when you say in the minor [n.101] that the truth of the Eucharist could be saved while the bread remains, or without transubstantiation, I say that it would have been very possible for God to have instituted that his body would be truly present with the substance of the bread remaining, or with the accidents after annihilation of the bread, and then the truth of the Eucharist would truly have been there just as it would also with the annihilation of the bread, because there would be a true sign and a true thing signified. But this is not now the whole truth of the Eucharist, for God did not so institute it, as the adduced authorities say [nn.94-96]. And when it is said that for the truth of the Eucharist there is only required a true sign and a true thing signified, I say that this is true in the way the sign was instituted and in the way the thing signified should correspond to it; but now it is not precisely so, namely that the body of Christ is along with something else (namely along with the bread or with the accidents of the bread indistinctly), but it has now been instituted that, namely, the thing signified is only under the accidents as under a sign.

139. To the second [n.103] I say that no article [of the faith] should be pressed into something difficult to understand unless the understanding be true; and if it is true and is evidently proved to be true, the article should, when it is specifically inquired into, be held according to that understanding, because no other specific understanding is true. But such, from the authorities alleged [nn.94-96], is the supposition about the understanding of this article.

140. And then to the third argument [n.105], about where the force of the matter stands, one must say that the Church has declared that this understanding belongs to the truth of the faith, in the Creed issued under Innocent III in the Lateran Council, “We firmly believe etc.” (as was cited above [n.135]), where the truth of the articles to be believed is explicitly set down, more explicitly than is contained in the Apostles’ Creed or the Athanasian or Nicene Creed. And in brief, whatever it is said there must be believed is to be held to be of the substance of the faith - and this after the solemn declaration made by the Church.

141. And if you ask why the Church wanted to choose this difficult way of understanding the article, although the words of Scripture about it could be saved by an easy understanding and one that is truer to appearance about this article, I say that the Scriptures are to be expounded by the Spirit by whom they were established. And thus one must suppose that the Catholic Church, taught “by the Spirit of truth” [John 16.13], has expounded them in that way, just as the faith has handed them on to us. And for this reason has the Church chosen this understanding, because it is true. For it was not in the power of the Church to make it true or not true, but in that of God who is institutor. But the Church has expounded the understanding handed on from God, being directed in this, as is believed, by the Spirit of truth.

142. To the fourth argument [n.107] one could say that accidents do not always signify actually that the substance they qualify exists, but they are always apt to do so; or if they do now signify actually, there is no falsity in the sign as it is a sign, because as it is a sign instituted at pleasure so it has a thing signified for what is instituted.